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1.  Introduction
The practice of ukuthwala in South Africa has recently
received negative publicity, with numerous complaints
being recorded. In the first and second quarter of 2009,
the media reported that ‘more than 20 Eastern Cape girls
are forced to drop out of school every month to follow the
traditional custom of ukuthwala (forced marriage)‘1.  Girls
as young as 12 years are forced to marry older men, in
some cases with the consent of their parents or guardians.
Commenting on the matter, Congress of Traditional
Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa) chairman, Chief
Mwelo Nokonyana, said ukuthwala was ‘an old custom
that was now being wrongly practised in several parts of
the eastern Transkei.’2 Dr Nokuzola Mdende of the
Camagwini Institute also stated ‘that abducting a girl of
12 or 13 is not the cultural practice we know. This is not
ukuthwala, this is child abuse. At 12, the child is not ready
to be a wife.’3 At the SA Law Reform Commission
‘Roundtable Discussion on the practice of Ukuthwala’,4
which was held as part of its preliminary investigation to
determine whether the proposal should be included in the
Commission’s law reform programme and in an effort to
gather information on the subject, it was observed that
ukuthwala, like many other customary institutions, has
changed radically. The practice has now taken on other
dimensions, including young girls forcibly being married
to older men, relatives of the girl kidnapping and taking
the girls themselves as wives, and abductions not being
reported to the Traditional Authorities.5
These changed practices around ukuthwala potentially
increase the vulnerability of children’s’ rights violations.
The main aim of this article is to evaluate the implications
of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 for ukuthwala. Insofar as
the recent media comments are pertinent to some of the
conclusions reached in this article, a preliminary discussion
of ukuthwala in its differing dimensions is important. For
that reason in the second part of this article we trace the
history of ukuthwala, and the traditional reasons for, and
the different forms of, ukuthwala. We further discuss the
procedure of ukuthwala and the legal position of the
practice under customary law. In the third part, we will
contextualise the debate of ukuthwala within the
constitutional and international rights to culture and
equality paradigms. In the fourth part, we proceed by
looking at the framework for the consideration of culture
and custom in the Children’s Act before discussing the
implications of the Children’s Act for ukuthwala. The last
part contains some conclusions.
2. Ukuthwala
2.1 What is ukuthwala?
In South Africa, the custom originated from the
Xhosas.6 However, although the custom is predominantly
practiced among Xhosa-speaking tribes,7 the practice has
expanded into different ethnic groups. For example, the
Mpondo clan has adopted ukuthwala from Xhosa clans
such as the Mfengus.8 Young Sotho men, through contact
with other tribes, have also adopted the practice which
was otherwise foreign amongst them.9 Ukuthwala in
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1 The Herald 6 April 2009; Sunday Times 31 May 2009, 3.
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3 The Herald 6 April 2009.
4 Convened on 30 November 2009. Dr Mwambene attended this forum and copies of the papers presented are on file.
5 Adv Ntsebeza ‘Background to the investigation of Ukuthwala’ presented at the SA Law Reform Commission (n 5 above).
6 M Ngcobo ‘Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on the Role of the Department of Social Development on Ukuthwala’, 15 September 2009.
7 JC Bekker, C Rautenbach and NMI Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa (2006), 31.
8 Ngcobo (n 6 above).
9 JC Bekker Customary Law in Southern Africa (1989), 98.
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South Africa enjoys popular support in the areas where it
is still practiced.10 According to a newspaper report, one
Chief (a woman) in the region where ukuthwala is
practiced said that the young girls who escape from the
houses where they are detained whilst awaiting marriage
were ‘embarrassing our village’.11
The word Ukuthwala means ‘to carry’.12 It is a culturally
legitimated abduction of a woman whereby, preliminary
to a customary marriage,13 a young man will forcibly take
a girl to his home.14 Some authors have described
ukuthwala as the act of ‘stealing the bride’.15 Ukuthwala
has also been described as a mock abduction or irregular
proposal16 aimed at achieving a customary marriage.17
From these definitions, we see that ukuthwala is in itself
not a customary marriage or an engagement. The main
aim of ukuthwala is to force the girl’s family to enter into
negotiations for the conclusion of a customary marriage.18
(Emphasis added).
The procedure for ukuthwala is as follows: The
intending bridegroom, with the help of the one or two
friends, will waylay the intended bride in the
neighbourhood of her own home, quite often late in the
day.19 They will then ‘forcibly’ take her to the young man’s
home. Sometimes the girl is caught unawares, but in many
instances she is caught according to prior plan and
agreement. In either case, the girl will put up a show of
resistance to suggest to onlookers that it is against her will,
when in fact, it is seldom  so. As Bekker explains: ‘The girl,
to appear unwilling and to preserve her maidenly dignity,
will usually put up strenuous but pretended resistance, for,
more often than not, she is a willing party’.20 Once the girl
has been taken to the man’s village, her guardian or his
messenger will then follow up on the same day or the next
day and possibly take her back if one or more cattle are
not handed to him as an earnest promise for a future
marriage.21 Consequently, if the guardian does not follow
her up to take her back, tacit consent to the marriage at
customary law can be assumed.
After the girl has been carried to the man’s family
hearth, negotiations for lobolo between the families of the
bride and the groom would then follow. If the families
cannot reach an agreement, the girl will return to her
parental home, while the man’s family will be liable for
damages.22
As noted, the main aim of ukuthwala is to force the
girl’s family to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of
a customary marriage. It follows, therefore, that if a man
abducts a girl but fails to offer marriage, or if he does offer
marriage but is deemed by the girl’s guardian to be
unacceptable as a suitor, a fine of one beast is payable to
the girl’s guardian,23 who, with his daughter, is said to have
been insulted by the thwala without a consequent offer of
a marriage, or having been thwala’d by the undesirable
suitor.24
It is important to note that during the process of
ukuthwala, it is contrary to custom to seduce a girl.25 By
custom, the suitor, after forcibly taking the girl to his home
village, is required to report the thwala to his family head.
The family head thereupon gives the girl into the care of
the women of his family home, and sends a report to the
10 The prevalence of the custom nowadays can be depicted from what Koyana and Bekker (n 14 above) 139, note: ‘from enquiries that we made and on the
basis of our own observations we rest assured that the thwala custom is still widely practised in Nguni communities.’
11 This was a response to a report in the Sunday Times 31 May, 2009, 3 that the current practice of ukuthwala also takes the form of detaining these girls
against their will in guarded huts and forced to have sex with their ‘husbands’. They allegedly get beaten and humiliated should they try to escape. 
12 DS Koyana Customary law in a changing society (1980), 1.
13 A customary marriage is a relationship which concerns not only the husband and wife, but also the family groups to which they belonged before the
marriage.
14 Koyana (n 12 above)
15 E Curran and E Bonthuys ‘Customary law and domestic violence in rural South African communities’ (2005) South African Journal on Human Rights, 607,
615
16 It should be noted that ‘irregular’ did not mean ‘unlawful’.
17 TW Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004), 212
18 JC Bekker, C Rautenbach and NMI Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa (2006) 31. It should, however, be observed that ukuthwala can
be distinguished from the common law abduction.  At common law, the crime of abduction has been described as the unlawful removal of a minor from
the control of his or guardian with the intention of violating the guardian’s potestas and of enabling somebody to marry her or have sexual intercourse with
her. On the other hand, ukuthwala is lawful in the society that designed it; there is no ukuthwala of males; and lastly, the purpose of ukuthwala is to
negotiate a marriage, not conclude it, and sexual intercourse is customarily not the intention.
19 Bekker (note 9 above), 98; DS Koyana and JC Bekker ‘The Indomitable Ukuthwala Custom’ (2007) De Jure 139.
20 Bekker (n 9 above) 98.
21 Bekker (n 9 above) 98.
22 E Curran and E Bonthuys, ‘Customary Law and Domestic Violence in rural South African Communities’ Research Report  for the Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation, (2004) 615.
23 Mostly, among the Pondo, the Fengu and the Bhaca, and possibly other Cape tribes.
24 Bekker (n 9 above) 98.
25 Bekker (n 9 above) 98.
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girl’s guardian. A man who seduces a thwala’d girl is
required to pay a seduction beast in addition to the
number of lobolo cattle agreed upon and in addition to
the thwala beast where no marriage has been proposed.26
Other safeguards that were put in place for the protection
of the thwala and the girl involved were that the parents
of the girl were immediately notified after the thwala had
occurred; if the thwala had not worked, a beast was
supposed to be paid; and finally if a girl fell pregnant
consequent upon her seduction, then further additional
penalties were also supposed to be paid.27
Numerous reasons exist for the practice of ukuthwala,
some of which are arguably cogent and weighty. They
include: to force the father of the girl to give his consent;28
to avoid the expense of the wedding; to hasten matters if
the woman is pregnant; to persuade the woman of the
seriousness of the suitor’s intent; and to avoid the need to
pay an immediate lobolo where the suitor and his or her
family were unable to afford the bridewealth. From these
reasons, it is apparent that ukuthwala can serve important
cultural purposes in those South African communities
which live their lives accordingly to cultural norms.
However, these reasons are also suggestive of the fact that
the girl or the unmarried woman involved is, in some
cases, thwala’d without her consent. This provides the link
to forced marriage, which then calls into play
constitutional and human rights standards. In addition,
insofar as the girl who is thwala’d may be aged below 18,
issues related to child marriage and early marriage arise
which in turn calls for a consideration of some provisions
of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.
2.2 Forms of Ukuthwala 
It is generally accepted that the traditional custom of
ukuthwala is often carried out with the knowledge and
consent of the girl or her guardian. This obviously suggests
that ukuthwala is not necessarily effected against her will,
or that of her guardian.29 In the past, courts have held
that ukuthwala should not be used as a cloak for forcing
unwelcome attentions on a patently unwilling girl;30 they
have also held that abduction by way of ukuthwala is
unlawful.31 On the other hand, courts have suggested that
if there is a belief by the abductor that the custom is lawful
and that the parents or guardians consented to the taking,
it would not be abduction because abduction is a crime
against parental authority.32
We briefly look in this section at what we propose to be
three forms of ukuthwala.33 First, the practice that occurs
where a girl is aware of the intended abduction and there
is collusion between the parties,34 i.e. where the girl or
woman being abducted conspires with her suitor. The
‘force’ used in the act of abduction is therefore for the sake
of performance only. For that reason, ukuthwala in this
model could be suggested to be equivalent to
elopement.35 In this type of ukuthwala, the girl gives her
consent.36 The issue of consent is additionally important
because, as observed earlier, ukuthwala is a preliminary
procedure to a customary marriage and not a marriage in
itself. The consent to ukuthwala presumably carries
through the negotiations, to provide the basis for the
validity of the (customary) marriage which is eventually
concluded. If after the ukuthwala has taken place, the girl’s
parents refuse to give their consent, there cannot be a
valid ensuing customary marriage.37
Second, ukuthwala also takes the form of where
families would agree on the union, but the girl is unaware
of such an agreement.38 It has been observed that this
type of ukuthwala often happened in cases where the girl
26 Koyana and Bekker (n 19 above) 141.
27 F Mdumbe ‘International and domestic legal frameworks impacting on Ukuthwala’ presented at the SA Law Reform Commission Roundtable on the
practice of Ukuthwala, 30  November 2009.
28 It should be observed that before the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998, consent of the girl’s father was essential to the validity of the
customary marriage. It is, moreover, argued that this requirement may still be necessary because section 3 (b) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages
Act provides that ‘the marriage must be negotiated … in accordance with customary law.’ Unless the last phrase is read as referring only to ceremonial
aspects of customary law, and the payment of lobola, the requirement of parental consent (as at customary law) is also requirement for a valid customary
marriage under the Act. See further note 37 below.
29 Curran and Bonthuys (n 22 above) 615.
30 Nkupeni v Numunguny 1938 NAC (C &O) 77.
31 R v Swartbooi 1916 EDL 170; R v Sita 1954 4 SA 20 (E).
32 R v Sita (n31 above).
33 Bekker, Rautenbach and Goolam (n 18 above), 31.
34 LAWSA  Indigenous Law Vol 32, 2009, para 89.
35 LAWSA (n 32 above), para 89.
36 M Herbst and W Du Plessis ‘Customary law v Common law: A hybrid Approach in South Africa’ (2008) 12 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 6.
37 The 1998 Recognition of Customary Marriages does not make provision for ukuthwala. It has, however, put beyond doubt the necessity for the consent
of the bride to a customary marriage. In terms of section 3(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, the consent of both spouses is necessary for
the validity of a customary marriage. (The consent of the guardian is discussed in note 28 above).
38 Bekker, Rautenbach and Goolam (n 18 above), 31.
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might not otherwise agree to her parent’s choice. It also
happens in situations where a girl happens to be of high
rank but, for various reasons, attracts no suitors.39 After
the girl has been thwala’d and both families’ desire and
consent to the union established, the girl is watched until
she gets used to the idea of the marriage.40 Consent,
understood in western terms, might be more difficult to
argue here.
The third version is where the custom occurs against
the will of the bride. Under this form, a girl is taken to the
family home of the young man by force.  Emissaries are
then sent to her family to open marriage negotiations.  The
family of the girl may refuse negotiations in which case a
beast is payable41 and the girl is taken back to her family.
In this form of ukuthwala, there is no initial consent from
either the girl or her parents or guardian. In addition, in its
most abusive form, the forced abduction can expose the
girl to rape by her ‘husband’ and to actual or threatened
violence in order to keep her in the relationship.42 In this
form of ukuthwala, we see that the bride is unwilling and
therefore the intended marriage would, arguably, be a
forced marriage. Other human rights violations are
obvious, including the infringement of freedom and
security of the person, violation of bodily integrity, dignity
and various provisions which prohibit forms of slavery, to
name a few.
As a general proposition, it can be concluded that some
forms of ukuthwala do violate women and children’s
rights. At the same time, there are also some legitimate
cultural goals which come with the practice and which
arguably do not overstep the mark. How to address the
objectionable forms of the practice of ukuthwala,
therefore provides a suitable vehicle for pursuing the
debate on whether criminalisation, or enacting an
absolute prohibition of discriminatory customary laws, is
the desirable path to follow. On the one hand, there is the
abiding interest in improving the position of women and
children affected by traditional customary practices which
can be harmful or detrimental, by proscribing them
altogether; however, on the other hand, for many
supporters of ukuthwala, the practice serves to promote
legitimate cultural goals, at least one of which is to force
the father of the girl to start marriage negotiations. For
this group, criminalisation or prohibition would abrogate
a cultural practice with considerable legitimacy, and
impair the right to culture.
3.  Contextualising ukuthwala within the
constitutional and international human
rights paradigms
From the above discussion, several conclusions with
constitutional implications can be drawn from the practice
of ukuthwala. First, it is clear that the practice of
ukuthwala only subjects unmarried women and girls, and
not unmarried men and boys, to it. As a customary
practice applicable to only girls, gender equality is called
into play. Second, the discussion has also shown that with
some forms of ukuthwala, girls are thwala’d without their
consent. This violates their bodily integrity and freedom
and security of the person. Third, the reported incidents of
the current practice of ukuthwala show that the practice
has taken the form of a ‘forced marriage’ and is no longer
merely a preliminary process undertaken in the lead up to
a customary marriage. Fourth, we see that current trends
related to ukuthwala, may lead to ‘child marriages’. Fifth,
reports show that ukuthwala is proving to be a serious
contributing factor leading to violence against women and
children. 
3.1  Ukuthwala and the right to equality
Both the South African Constitution, in section 9, as
well as international human rights standards prohibit
discrimination based on sex and recognise equality of both
sexes.43 The significance of this principle where women's
rights are concerned cannot be over-emphasised. Indeed,
as Cook  points out44 in the international sphere at more
or less the same time as the South African constitution
was adopted:
The reasons for this general failure to enforce
women's rights are complex and vary from
country to country. They include lack of
understanding of the systemic nature of the
subordination of women, failure to recognise
39 Bennett (n 17 above) 212.
40 K Woods ‘Contextualizing group rape in South Africa’ (2005) 7 Culture, Health and Sexuality 303 at 313.
41 LAWSA (note 32 above) para 89; Bekker (n 9 above) 98.
42 Curran and Bonthuys (n 22 above) 616.
43 Article 1 of the UN Charter; Article 2 of UDHR; Article 2 of CESCR; Article 2 (1) of the CCPR; Article 2 of CEDAW and Article 2 and 3 of the ACHPR.
44 RJ Cook `Women's International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward' in RJ Cook (ed) Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives
(1994) 3 at 3.
45 Cook (n 44 as above). See, for example, Art.18 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; Art.1 of CEDAW; and Art.24 (3) of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child.
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the need to characterise the subordination as
a human rights violation, and lack of state
practice to condemn discrimination against
women.
To this end, she observes that the legal obligation to
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women is a
fundamental tenet of international human rights law.45
In South Africa, the Constitutional Court has
consistently affirmed the fact that the principle of equality
and non-discrimination is recognized, and its value
conceded even in the contest of competing claims of the
right to equality and the right to culture. In the  Bhe case,46
for example, Langa, DCJ noted that:
The rights to equality … are of the most
valuable of rights in an open and democratic
state. They assume special importance in
South Africa because of our past history of
inequality and hurtful discrimination on
grounds that include race and gender.
At the point of entering into a marriage, several
international human rights standards require that there
should be equality of both spouses. For example, article
16 (1) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 1948
(UDHR) provides that … ‘Men and women of full age …
have the right to marry and found a family. They are
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and
at its dissolution.’ In article 16 (2) UDHR, ‘Marriage shall be
entered into only with the free and full consent of the
intending parties’. In addition to the UDHR, article 1 of the
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for
Marriage and Registration of Marriages, 1964 provides that
‘No marriage shall be legally entered into without the full
and free consent of both parties … ‘ 
Furthermore, article 16 of CEDAW provides:
States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations and in particular shall
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse
and to enter into marriage only with their free
and full consent.
CEDAW is fully applicable to girls under 18 years of age.
Article 16(2) of CEDAW provides that the betrothal and
marriage of a child shall have no legal effect and that all
necessary action, including legislative action, shall be
taken by States to specify a minimum age of marriage,
and to make registration of marriage in an official registry
compulsory. In addition, in 1994, a General
Recommendation on Equality and Family Relations, the
Committee on CEDAW recommended that the minimum
age for marriage for both boys and girls should be 18.
At the regional level, the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC)47 sets the framework
to eliminate gender discriminatory practices. The ACRWC
prohibits discrimination of children in any form and
guarantees all children to enjoy the rights and freedoms
recognised in the ACRWC ‘irrespective of the child’s or
his/her parents’ or legal guardians’ race, ethnic group,
colour, sex … birth or other status. Member states to the
ACRWC have the obligation to adopt legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
provisions of the Charter.48
Further, the ACRWC defines a child as ‘every human
being below the age of 18 years’.49 This definition
highlights the significance of addressing discrimination in
African societies in a number of ways.50 First, according
to this definition, ACRWC applies to every child under the
age of eighteen in ratifying countries, irrespective of sex.
Secondly, the ACRWC unequivocally prohibits child
marriages of both boys and girls under the age of 18. To
that end, Mezmur has observed that the ACRWC provide
greater protection than the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, and avoids any discrepancy between the
minimum age of marriage for both boys and girls, which is
consistently lower for girls in many countries.51
Furthermore, the ACRWC is unequivocal with regard to
the relationship between culture and children’s rights. It
explicitly asserts its supremacy over any custom, tradition,
cultural or religious practice inconsistent with the rights
and obligations guaranteed under it.52
46 Bhe and others v Magistrate Khayelitsha (Commissioner for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2005(1) BCLR 1 (CC); 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC)
47 South Africa became a party to the ACRWC on 7 January 2000.
48 Article 1 (1) of the Charter.
49 Article 2 of the Charter.
50 This significance is appreciated when the definition of a child under the Charter is contrasted with the definition of a child provided by the CRC. The CRC
defines a child as ‘every human being below the age of 18 years unless, under the laws applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’. Marriage would
typically result in majority status being attained. 
51 B Mezmur ‘The African Children’s Charter versus the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: A zero-sum game? (2008) 23 SAPR/PL, 20.
52 Article 1(3) of the Charter.
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Further protection of women and children affected by
discriminatory practices in Africa is provided under the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Protocol).53
The Protocol provides that states parties shall enact
appropriate national legislative measures to guarantee,
inter alia, free and full consent of both parties to a
marriage.54 The Protocol has also set the minimum age
for both girls and boys contemplating a marriage at 18.55
From the above discussion, we see that the practice of
ukuthwala has the strong potential to violate international
human rights standards, especially where a forced
marriage is the result of such practice. Equality norms
make clear that men and women are to have equal rights
at the point of entry into marriage. Some forms of
ukuthwala are clearly in violation of this right. Moreover,
the right to free and full consent to a marriage, as
recognised in the international human rights standards,
cannot be achieved  when one of the parties involved is
not sufficiently mature to make an informed decision. This
position is applicable to cases of ukuthwala where, as
reported, girls as young as 12 years are abducted.
Furthermore, where consent is obtained through force, this
is also a clear violation of the international standards that
require that there should be free and full consent from
both parties.
3.2 Right to culture
South Africa’s constitution expressly recognizes the
practice of one’s culture, provided that persons exercising
cultural rights may not do so in a manner that is
inconsistent with any other provisions of the Bill of
Rights.56 Based on the constitutional recognition of the
right to culture, proponents of ukuthwala would argue that
everyone, including, the state is prohibited from
interfering with their right to practice ukuthwala. As
argued by Bennett,57 ‘the recognition of culturally defined
systems of law has become a constitutional right, vesting
in groups and individuals, with the implication that the
State has a duty to allow people to participate in the
culture of their choice, including a duty to uphold the
institutions on which that culture is based’. Devenish58 has
also argued that ‘the right to practice one’s culture allows
members of communities to freely engage in the practice
of their culture without intervention from the state or any
other source’. 
Sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution appear to be
similar in wording to several international standards. An
obvious example is article 27 of the UDHR.59 Other
examples of the recognition of the right to culture in
international law are article 15 (1) (a) of the CESCR, 27 of
the CCPR and article 29 of the CRC.  On the regional level,
the rights to culture were first declared in article 17 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.60
From the above discussion, we see that both
international human rights law and the South African
Constitution recognize the right to culture. This
notwithstanding, cultural rights are not regarded as
providing a basis on which other protections may be
abridged.61 Rather than protecting culture at the expense
of human rights, international documents reveal that
culture necessarily must cede to universal standards.62
Indeed it is suggested that culture is protected so that it
may enhance human rights development, and, in turn, not
53 The Protocol, which entered into force on 25 November 2005, is the first specialized gender neutral instrument for the protection of women’s rights in
Africa. It was adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Governments of the African Union (AU) at its second ordinary session, on 11th July 2003
in Maputo, Mozambique. It was promulgated out of concern by the AU that women in Africa continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices
(see Preamble to the Protocol).
54 Article 6 (a) of the Protocol.
55 Article 6 (b) of the Protocol.
56 Ss 30 and 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
57 TW Bennett ‘Conflict of laws’ in Bekker, Rautenbach and Goolam (n 18 above) 18.
58 G Devenish A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 421.
59 Article 27 of the UDHR states that: `Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits; Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author.’ The right to culture is also an integral part of other fundamental rights enunciated in the UDHR such as freedom
from conscience, expression and religion
60 South Africa ratified this treaty in July 1996.
61 L Mwambene The impact of the Bill of Rights on African customary family laws: A study of women’s rights in Malawi with some reference to developments in
South Africa (2009) Unpublished LLD thesis, University of the Western Cape.
62 R Cook `State Accountability under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women' in R Cook (ed) Human Rights of
Women: National and International Perspectives (1994) 228 at 234-235.
63 J Sloth-Nielsen and B Mezmur ‘Surveying the research landscape to promote children’s legal rights in an African context’ 2007 African Human Rights Law
Journal, 330, 335-336 observe that ‘human rights documents continually recognise that culture is an area that must be protected. However, culture should
be harnessed for the advancement of children’s rights. But when it appears that children are disadvantaged or disproportionately burdened by cultural
practice, the benefits of the cultural practice and the harm of the human rights violation must be weighed against each other. How to strike a necessary balance
between culture and children’s rights is an issue that should continue to engage the minds of scholars.’
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lead to the derogation or diminution of rights.63
International treaty law exemplifies the approach that
places the preservation of human rights as the most
fundamental universal principle, even when human rights
protections challenge cultural practices. Article 5 of
CEDAW requires States Parties to take all appropriate
measures to:
modify the social and cultural patterns of
men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women.64
The CRC also confronts the possibility of misuse of
culture as a pretext to violate children’s rights insofar as
article 24 (3) provides that `States Parties shall take all
effective and appropriate measures with a view to
abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of
children'. Furthermore, the CRC clearly places a focus on
the child's best interests,65 the child's evolving capacities,66
the principle of non-discrimination67 and the respect for
the child's evolving capacities68 all of which recenter the
focus of human rights on children and require placing
children's interests before those of potentially abusive
cultural practices.
The African Women’s Protocol contains provisions
relating to the elimination of harmful practices including
the prohibition, through legislative measures backed by
sanctions, of all forms of harmful cultural practices,
including female genital mutilation.69 Harmful practices
have been regarded as receiving ‘the most’ attention in
the Protocol.70
On the other hand, some scholars’ approach, largely
influenced by cultural relativism theory, conceives another
version of addressing the conflict between culture and
human rights. They argue that instead of abolishing
customary laws that appear to be inimical to human
rights, we should closely look at local cultures and see
which aspects we can best use to achieve the aspirations
of human rights.71 This approach would militate against
the view that ukuthwala should be proscribed in its
entirety. 
Specifically addressing himself to this view, Ibhawoh
states that:71
…  it is not enough to identify the cultural
barriers and limitations to modern domestic
and international human rights standards. It
is even more important to understand the
social basis of these cultural traditions and
how they may be adapted to or reintegrated
with national legislation to promote human
rights. Such adaptation and integration must
be done in a way that does not compromise
the cultural integrity of peoples. In this way,
the legal and policy provisions of national
human rights can derive their legitimacy not
only from the state authority, but also from
the force of cultural traditions.
These insights may be important to the analysis of the
implications of the Children’s Act for ukuthwala in South
Africa. Thus, it may be necessary to distinguish between
the practice of ukuthwala in forms which are inimical to
human rights and may lead to human rights abuses, and
those dimensions of the practice that advantage human
rights, and promote the right to culture. In the light of the
fact that the right to practice ukuthwala in South Africa
continues to be asserted by people who are in opposition
to change the custom, it may arguably be preferable to
explore options which retain the positive features of the
custom, rather than advocating an abolitionist/
prohibitionist stance which denies any value in the
customary version of ukuthwala.73
However, the idea of developing customary laws so
that they are consistent with human rights comes into
direct confrontation with debates about the protection of
women and children against discrimination and their
protection against violence. Whilst the development or
adaptation of customary law is considered to be a viable
64 See too article 2 of CEDAW, which requires: `State Parties … by all appropriate means and without delay … (to) undertake: (f) .. appropriate measures,
including legislation to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women.'
65 Articles 3, 9, 20, 21,and 40 of the CRC
66 Articles 5, 12, 14 and 40 of the CRC
67 Article 2 and the Preamble of the CRC.
68 Articles 21, 28, 39, 40, and Preamble of the CRC.
69 Article 5 of the Protocol.
70 F Banda ‘Building on a global movement: Violence against women in the African context’ 2008(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 1 at16.
71 Nyamu-Musembi C `Are local norms and practices fences or pathways? The example of women's property rights' 126 as cited by Banda (n ) 256.
72 Ibhawoh B `Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights in the African State' (2000) Human Rights Quarterly
838 at 839.
73 At the discussion forum convened by the SA Law Reform Commission, most people were of the view that there was nothing wrong with ukuthwala as it
was originally practiced and that, despite the recent distortions of the practice, the custom should not be outlawed.
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approach to achieving international human rights
aspirations because of the cultural legitimacy that
achieves,74 feminist scholars and children’s rights
advocates alike might question whether this can be done
at all without sacrificing the protection of women and
children on the altar of custom.75 In the case of Christian
Education of South Africa v Minister of Education,76 the
Constitutional Court affirmed that the rights of members
of communities that associate on the basis of language,
culture and religion cannot be used to shield practices
which offend the Bill of Rights.77 In this case, it was
instructive to note that, for the discussion related to the
practice of ukuthwala, children’s rights to protection from
violence trumped justificatory claims based on religion. By
analogy, it could be predicted that courts may not uphold
the practice of ukuthwala if it even has the mere potential
for infringing other constitutional rights.
Fear of opening the door to trenchant violations of the
physical security of South African women and children
might blur and diminish arguments which advocate a
more sensitive and nuanced treatment of the custom
through which the positive aspects can be retained.  We
return to this in conclusion.
4. Exploring the impact of the Children’s
Act 38 of 2005 on ukuthwala?
4.1 Culture and religion in the Children’s Act
The authors would assert that the Children’s Act 38 of
2005 (hereafter the Act) is consciously sensitive to culture.
Any number of provisions support this claim, including
both direct and indirect references to the importance of
culture in child rearing and legal approaches thereto. For
instance, the ‘best interest of the child’ principle outlined
in section 7 requires consideration to be had, where
relevant, to the child’s ‘intellectual, emotional, social and
cultural development’ (section 7((1)(h)), and mentions the
need for children to maintain a connection with (inter alia)
‘the extended family, culture and tradition’ (s 7(1)(f)(ii)) as
a consideration conducing to the child’s best interests
(emphasis inserted).
As far as placement of the child in alternative care is
concerned, there are various provisions emphasizing the
importance of culture. Foster care, for example, requires
placement of a child after consideration of a report of a
designated social worker about ‘the cultural, religious and
linguistic background of the child’ (section 186(1)(a)), and
this cultural matching is reinforced further by the
permissive provision to place a child from a different
cultural, religious and linguistic background with foster
parents whose characteristic are different to that of the
child ‘but only if… there is an existing bond between that
person and the child’ (section 186(2)(a)) or if no suitable
person can with a similar background can be found
available to provide foster care to the child (section
186(2)(b)). The Norms and Standards for Foster Care (Part
111(6)(g) require foster care services, supervision and
arrangements around such supervision to ‘be sensitive to
the religious, cultural and linguistic background of the
child’.
In the assessment of the suitability of a prospective
adoptive parent, the social workers effecting the
assessment ‘may take the cultural and community
diversity of the adoptable child and the prospective
adoptive parent into consideration’ (section 231(3), and
the Regulations to the Act affirm that in an inter-country
adoption process, the report on the would-be adoptive
parents must include information on the applicant’s
ethnic, religious and cultural background (regulation
111(e)).
Additionally, culturally appropriate values and
principles surface periodically throughout the Children’s
Act: the legislative provision (in section 16) for the
responsibilities of children, as provided for article 31 of the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,78 is
a case in point. 
In addition to the positive way in which culture
emerges as a general consideration in the Children’s Act,
culture and social practice derived therefrom form the
74 AA An-Naim `State Responsibility under the International Human Rights Law to change Religious and Customary Laws' in Cook RJ Human rights of women:
National and International Perspectives (1994) 167 at 173-175 argues that unless international human rights have sufficient legitimacy within particular cultures
and traditions, their implementation will be thwarted, particularly at the domestic level, but also at the regional and international levels. Without such
legitimacy, it will be nearly impossible to improve the status of women through the law or other agents of social change.
75 Grant E `Human rights, cultural diversity and customary law in South Africa' (2006) Journal of African Law 2 reflects on the difficulties of legal pluralism in
relation to the Bhe case: `As the judgment shows, on one level, reconciling equality and culture is simply a matter of identifying those aspects of customary
laws which offend the constitutional guarantee of equality, and striking them down. On the other level, it required the striking down of the male primogeniture
rule in customary laws as incompatible with the right to gender equality. What to put in its place is far more complicated matter. It is complicated not merely
because of practical problems which preoccupied the majority of the court in Bhe case, but because of potentially contradictory demands of equality and the
maintenance of legal dualism'.
76 Christian Education of South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (SCA) 711 para 26.
77 See also T Maseko ‘The Constitutionality of the State’s intervention with the practice of male traditional circumcision in South Africa’ (2008) Obiter 192.
78 See J Sloth-Nielsen and B Mezmur, ‘A Dutiful Child: The Implications of Article 31 of the African Children’s Charter’ 2008 (52) Journal of African Law 159.
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basis of a dedicated section of the Act, namely section 12
(titled ‘Social, cultural and religious practices’). The section
regulates in detail two customary practices, namely male
circumcision (section 12(8)- (10) and virginity testing
(section 12(4)-(7).79 Female genital mutilation is also
prohibited (section 12(3)).  
Ukuthwala, it is worth noting at the outset, is not
mentioned by name as a customary practice in this
section, a fact which might become relevant were the
effects of the Act upon the practice to be considered. It
might, for instance, be inferred that the legislature knew
about the social practice as evidenced by prior writing80
and research on the practice, and, by choosing not to refer
to ukuthwala, signaled that the custom did not require
regulation. An a priori stance that the practice had no
constitutional ramifications and did not necessitate
legislative intervention could therefore be argued.
This does not mean that ukuthwala is in any way
immune from future legal scrutiny. And, we suggest that
should the constitutional or legislative validity of the
practice be put in issue, it is possible that the impact of the
remainder of section 12’s provisions upon ukuthwala as a
customary practice might be called into question, insofar
as the practice has a bearing upon the girl child.
4.2 Section 12(1) and the overarching
prohibition on detrimental cultural practices
Section 12(1) contains the overarching right of every
child ‘not to be subjected to social, cultural and religious
practices which are detrimental to his or her wellbeing’.
This section, cast as a right of the child, is not hit by the
offences created by section 305 (the overarching penalties
clause of the Act). Hence, were ukuthwala to be
characterized as a social practice which either in general or
in a specific situation violated section 12(1) as a practice
‘detrimental to the child’s wellbeing’, the remedy would
not lie automatically lie in the penal sphere (as far as
contravening the Children’s Act is concerned: there may
well be criminal sanctions derived from other common law
or statutory offences, however). The potential for delictual
damages remains for any infringement of rights under this
section, though, as do other potential remedies for
infringements such as injunctions, declaratory orders and
interdicts, or preventive measures. 
The debate about whether ukuthwala contravenes
section 12(1) in any event (in the absence of any concrete
sanction being attached) requires an assessment as to
whether the practice is in fact a social and cultural practice
which is detrimental to the child’s wellbeing’. Our answer
to this must be context dependent: the abduction and
rape of a child without her consent falls undeniably to be
outlawed as a harmful cultural practice, albeit that the
sanctions of conventional criminal law might also be
brought to bear. However, equally, we are convinced that
not all forms of ukuthwala can be labeled as objectionable,
harmful or detrimental, as outlined above in previous
sections of this article. Any consideration of the
implications of s 12 is speculative, as the determination as
to whether the practice is detrimental will inevitably be
related to the actual circumstances which are laid before
the court for adjudication.  
4.3 Section 12(2)(a) and early marriage
Section 12(2) (a) of the Children’s Act is potentially of
direct relevance to determining the legal status of
ukuthwala. In fact, in ordinary parlance, this section would
probably be described as the ‘forced marriage’ prohibition
of the Act (as is required by the African Children’s Charter,
amongst other human rights documents).81
The first part, 12(2)(a), prohibits the ‘giving out’ in
either marriage or engagement ‘of a child below the
minimum age set by law for a valid marriage’. Several
comments may arise here:  ‘giving out’ (seemingly an old
fashioned terminological rendering of the marriage pact
between families) limits the usefulness of this article in
accommodating some versions of ukuthwala insofar as the
child ‘victim’ is concerned: a child who is thwala’d, as
described above, is definitely not in any conventional
sense of the word ‘given’, let alone ‘given out’. In fact, a
more suitable English rendition would be achieved by the
substitution of ‘given’ with ‘taken’!
A tentative conclusion is that this prohibition was not
drafted to target ukuthwala as conventionally understood.
It seems primarily to target early marriage, and the family-
79 See section 12(4), (5), (6) and (7) in respect of virginity testing, and section 12(8),(9) and (10) in respect of male circumcision. Regulations 3-6 elaborate
these provisions further. A detailed consideration is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to mention that the provisions on virginity testing were
particularly contested during Parliamentary hearings, and led to a compromise provision which sees prohibition in place for the practice where the child
to be subjected to the practice is below the age of 16 years, accompanied by the enactment of regulations prescribing how virginity testing is to be performed
to comply with the Act where the child is over 16 years and furnishes her consent. One of the authors of this article was a member of the team which drafted
the Regulations submitted to the Department of Social Development outlining the further requirements for the practice to be conducted in conformity
with the Act.
80 See, for instance, the prior work of Koyana and Bekker (note 19 above); Bennett (note 17 above).
81 Article 21(2) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child prohibiting both child marriage and betrothal. 
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to-family negotiations that may precede it.
Second, there are obvious and intractable difficulties
occasioned by the phrase ‘of a child below the minimum
age set by law for a valid marriage’ in section 12(2)(a). Not
the least of these problems relates to the variety of
minima set by law for valid marriages under different legal
regimes in South Africa.82 Mention has been made of the
minimum set for the recognition of a valid customary
marriage – 18 years – in terms of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act.83 But is the minimum ‘set by
law’ also a minimum under ‘unwritten’ customary law
which has also been recognized as ‘law’ for the some
purposes?84 Assuming a much lower age as the minimum
under most customary systems – eg around the age of
puberty or shortly thereafter – this provision could
potentially be of little practical effect in the protection of
children against early marriage (an explicit requirement of
the African Children’s Charter as well as a number of other
instruments relevant to South Africa). 
However, such an interpretation would render the
provision practically devoid of value, and would also raise
questions about the value of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act on setting a minimum age of 18
at all. Further, applying unwritten customary ages of
marriage would run counter to the overall legislative
intent that the Children’s Act apply to all children below
the age of 18 years (section 17). It is suggested, therefore,
that the ‘law’ setting a minimum age of marriage referred
to in section 12(1)(a) must refer to statutory law.
This does not assist in resolving the additional problem
that the Marriage Act of 1961 nevertheless continues to
contain a lower minimum age of marriage than 18 years,
descending to 15 years or even lower with Ministerial
consent,85 and moreover is one that discriminates between
boys and girls as regards the statutory minima set.86
As ‘pure’ civil law, this Act might not, it is submitted, be
of any relevance to explicating the legal status of
ukuthwala as a customary practice. Nevertheless, in
establishing the benchmark criterion of 15 years for girls as
the minimum age for marriage, it would be difficult to
argue that in law, any offensive practice regarding
engagement, promise of marriage or marriage itself is
restricted solely to persons above the age of 18 years,
when the Marriage Act itself so plainly provides otherwise.
It follows, therefore, that ukuthwala (when it is deployed
consensually as a prelude to marriage in the case of girls
below the age of 18 years) can hardly be regarded as being
contra bonos mores when the legal marriage of girls of that
age is permissible under the law of the land.87
4.4 Section 12(2)(b) and forced marriage
Section 12(2)(b) of the Act prohibits that a child ‘above
that minimum age be given out in marriage of in
engagement without her consent.’  It remains to discuss
whether section 12(2)(b) is useful as a shield against other
forms of ukuthwala (forced seduction, for want of a better
description), and if so how? Section 12(2)(b) can be
distinguished from section 12 (2)(a) in that it refers, first,
only to persons above the minimum age of marriage (as
already discussed, i.e. 15 years of age for girls), and
secondly, to their being given out in marriage or
engagement without their consent. This accords more
logically with the expectation of a prohibition on forced
marriage, where the focus is also on absence of consent or
upon duress. 
Section 12(2)(b) apparently therefore includes
ukuthwala within its ambit where the abduction is
performed without consent; however, the caveat is
whether ukuthwala can be brought within the legislative
words ‘marriage or engagement’ – seduction is not
mentioned, nor is it axiomatic that ‘seduction with the
view to an eventual marriage’ bears an equivalent
meaning – and, as important, whether the words ‘given
out’ in section 12(2)(b) can be given a clear and precise
meaning. 
To be blunt, can the ‘seducer’, or abductor, in the way
that ukuthwala has been described to take place, be
subsumed under the prohibition on ‘giving out’ a child in
marriage without her consent? This seems to strain the
ordinary meaning of the words unduly, as the mischief
targeted appears rather to be the act of offering the girl
for marriage without her consent, and the wrongdoer
likely to be a parent or family member, rather than the
seducer or abductor. If this interpretation is correct, then
ukuthwala does not fall foul of the section 12(2)(b)
prohibition. It is simply inapplicable to the practice.
82 Which in turn raises the potentially (indirectly) discriminatory application of this provision, since questions might arise as to which children are protected
by which set of laws setting minima.
83 Act 120 of 1998.
84 See the discussion of South African ‘law’ as including customary law in LAWSA (n 34 above).
85 As low as 12 years for girls and 14 years for boys, linked to the presumed age of puberty.
86 P Mahery and P Proudlock ‘Legal ages in South African Law 2010), Children’s Institute, University of Cape Town. 
87 The argument that section 12(2)(a) refers to the minimum age for marriage set in the Marriage Act is reinforced if regard is had to the provisions of section
12(2)(b) which refers to protections for persons above the minimum age of marriage. Since the Act as a whole applies to persons below the age of 18 only,
‘persons above the age of marriage’ referred to in section 12(2)(b) must mean some other age, i.e. one below the age of 18 years.
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On the other hand, it is possible to conceive that the
acts of a girl’s parents, were they to be complicit in making
arrangements with the abductor, without the girl’s
consent, would render their participation in ukuthwala
conduct which falls foul of section 12(2)(b). In this regard,
it is worth pointing out that section 12(2) is explicitly
subject to the penal sanctions of the Children’s Act
contained in section 305. 
The question which then arises is whether section 305,
read with section 12(2), renders ukuthwala subject to
criminal sanction? The preliminary answer to this, based
on the analysis above, is no (or not really?).
On the wording of both section 12(2)(a) and (b), the
infringement of rights is committed by whomever ‘give
the child out’ in marriage or engagement. That is the first
hurdle. The abductor’s conduct cannot be brought within
the plain meaning of these words. Second, the difficulties
with the internal conflict of laws relating to the minimum
age of marriage, and the requirement of a guardian’s
consent to validate a customary marriage88 might prove
a fatal defence to any prosecution: which law, one might
ask? And what of the nulla poena sine lege principle, which
at minimum requires certainty as to the conduct to be
deemed offensive?
Third, unless ukuthwala can be characterised as
marriage – which it is not, it is a prelude to marriage
negotiations – or engagement - which seems to be
stretching a civil/canonical law concept way beyond the
common meaning, it is not a practice which is covered by
the prohibition at all. It is submitted that the entry into
marriage negotiations expected in customary law, and
embodied in the practice of ukuthwala is not the same as
the concept of ‘engagement’ of civil law.89
At first blush, section 12(2)(b) does seem to embody a
forced marriage prohibition. But it is directed at only
parents or guardians who furnish their consent in
circumstances where that of the child is lacking, or where
they apply duress. It may well be, therefore,  that this
conception of forced marriage is in need of better
elaboration, and related more specifically to the South
African cultural context, in the same way as has recently
come to pass in the United Kingdom.90
Two remaining points require consideration in the
context of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, before the
discussion concludes with the consideration of ukuthwala
as a customary practice with legal dimensions under
current South African law.
The first question that may be posed is whether other
provisions of the Children’s Act may be adduced to
condemn or to outlaw the practice. The answer to this is
necessarily speculative, and rests largely on the approach
to section 305(3) which criminalises parental child abuse,
read with the various provisions which underscore the
child protection system (including section 150 which
defines a child in need of care and protection). Again, the
abductor is potentially not liable under this approach,
which focuses on the part played by parents and guardians.
Alternatively, recourse might be had to the offences
contained in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences)
Amendment Act of 2007, or to common law renditions of
kidnapping or abduction. When measured against the
array of options for the assimilation, accommodation and
development of customary law, these latter alternatives
can only be considered as blunt swords indeed by which to
address the nuances of custom and tradition under a
constitutional dispensation.
Finally, some consideration must be given to the option
of civil liability. Assuming that it is correct that ukuthwala
does not fall neatly under the provisions of section 12(2), an
infringement of the child’s rights to wellbeing contained in
section 12 (1) might conceivably lay the basis for such a
claim against the abductor/seducer. This is reinforced by
the conceptualization of custom of ukuthwala as a delictual
claim in customary law itself.
This might seem like an alarming proposition – along
the lines of sanctioning the payment of damages for rape.
It might, too, be regarded as perpetuating extreme gender
inequality and offensive stereotypes which achieve no
good in modern day South Africa (characterised by one of
the most violent societies in the world as far as gender
based violence and rape is concerned).
However, it does present the possibility of a more
benign accommodation of this particular customary
practice, in line with the desired objectives of current
constitutional jurisprudence. And, as demonstrated above,
the Children’s Act itself is far from a model of clear
condemnation of ukuthwala as a form of forced marriage.
88 Under customary law, the consent of the father was a sine qua non, regardless of the age of the girl. Tacit consent can be inferred from the circumstances.
Should the father, for example, accept lobolo or allow the couple to live together as man and wife, consent can be inferred.
89 Arranged marriages are not mentioned by name; there also the question of consent can be problematised when severe pressure is brought to bear on a
would-be child bride, often over a period of time, and she ultimately does in fact furnish consent, but for fear of prejudicing family relationships (for
instance).
90 See the UK Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 and the Multi-Agency Practice Guidelines Handling Cases of Forced Marriage of June 2009 issued
by the Forced Marriage Unit of the Ministry of Justice; see further H Patel and A Guha ‘Forced Marriage’ in Journal of Family Law and Practice vol 1.1 (May
2010).
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5. Conclusion 
Forced marriage fails the constitutional compatibility
test on any number of grounds, including freedom and
security of the person (s 12 of the constitution), dignity
rights (s 9), and the best interests of the child (s 28(2)).
Similarly, the précis of the practices of ukuthwala provided
in section 2 of this article would in the minds of most at
least prima facie contravene essential constitutional
requirements. However, ukuthwala is not, in plain sense of
the word, ‘forced marriage’, although it could lead to this
if the negotiations are concluded without the consent of
the girl. 
Further, though, we have argued that ukuthwala
cannot be treated as a unitary phenomenon; variants of
the practice must be distinguished. In attempting to
rescue or divide positive attributes of ukuthwala which do
not prima facie offend human rights, we suggest that
current legal terminology, such as that used in the
Children’s Act, is not sufficiently nuanced to describe and
regulate it. An example relates to the inclusion of the
words ‘giving out’ in sections 12(2)(a) and (b), which
confine the application of this section unduly.
Sensitivity to various ways in which customary law can
be accommodated would lead to a conclusion that South
African law should recognise those forms of ukuthwala
where the requirement of consent of the ‘bride’ is met, and
she colludes or is aware of the mock abduction. The legal
relevance of her participation in these acceptable forms of
ukuthwala should be acknowledged. Child participation,
and recognition of the evolving capacities of the child are
a basic tenet of the Children’s Act, and recognising the role
of the girl as an actor in her own interests via ukuthwala
thus promotes a fundamental principle of the Act.  The
benign accommodation approach promotes the positive
aspects of culture, and moreover emphasises children’s
agency. (It is conceded, however, that the ‘straight 18’
position of the African Children’s Charter in relation to
child marriage does pose a significant barrier to advocating
this position).
It would further be required that the common law
offence of abduction also be developed to permit forms
of mock abduction which are legal in customary law and
in which consent to being ‘carried away’ features.
However, where consent is absent and the abduction
becomes unlawful, we suggest that existing criminal
offences are adequate to cover the practice. There is
therefore no need for additional legislative intervention in
the criminal law sphere. 
